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1. Opening considerations on ECtHR’s approach 
Over the course of the last decades, the European Court of Human Right’s (ECtHR) jurisprudence has 
extended the protection of immigrants’ rights by means of a flexible interpretation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). It did so by appealing to the universal dimension of these norms – 
i.e. referring to any person, even though not directly aimed at regulating the condition of immigrants 
themselves (1). In particular, the ECtHR has outlined a juridical base to protect irregular immigrants from 
expulsion at the presence of given circumstances which actually extend the safeguards provided by 
immigration laws. Even though the ECtHR’s jurisprudence follows the international praxis, which 
acknowledges State’s prerogatives to control aliens’ admission – and with it the right to reject and expel 
immigrants – it has nonetheless limited the range of discretion of the High Contracting Parties. This is for 
instance the case when the return decision threatens the right to life (Article 2), does not guarantee 
                                                          
* Peer reviewed. This paper will be published as a chapter within the book “Aliens Before the European Court of Human 
Rights: Ensuring Minimum Standards Protection", ed. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
(1) See B. NASCIMBENE, Protocollo 4 – Artt. 3 e 4, , in Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo 
e delle libertà fondamentali, eds. S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI, L. RAIMONDI Padova, 2001; P. STANCATI, Le libertà 
civili del non cittadino: attitudine conformativa della legge, assetti irriducibili di garanzia, peculiarità degli apporti del parametro 
internazionale, in Lo statuto costituzionale del non cittadino – Associazione Italiana dei Costituzionalisti, Napoli, 2010, 107 ss.; B. 
RANDAZZO, Lo straniero nella giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo, in www.cortecostituzionale.it (studi e ricerche), 
2008. 
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compliance with the prohibition of torture (Article 3), does not secure the right to respect for private and 
family life (Article 8) or the right to an effective remedy (Article 13) of a third country’s citizen (2).  
While the recourse to Article 2 of the ECHR didn’t produce a significant jurisprudence (3), Article 3, 
enclosing the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, has often allowed the Strasburg 
Court to protect the rights of immigrants. In this way, the Courts guarantees compliance with the principle 
of non-refoulement, that is the prohibition of expulsion or extradition towards countries wherein there is a 
serious risk that a person would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (4).  
The Soering case (5) is the first example of such jurisprudence, whereby immigrants are provided indirect 
protection within the ECHR’s scope. In this case, the ECtHR found that if there is a real risk for the applicant 
of being subject to treatments in breach of Article 3, or of other severe violations of fundamental rights in 
the country of destination, the Member State shall not proceed with expulsion measures. The same principle 
has also been followed by the Court as far as the expulsion of irregular immigrant is concerned. The Cruz 
Varas case (6), which paved the way for further decisions on the same subject (7), dealt with the irregular 
entry in Sweden by a Chilean citizen. The applicant was a political opponent of the Pinochet regime. After 
being arrested and persecuted in his country, he illegally flew to Sweden, where he applied for asylum. 
Nonetheless, he was denied it and a procedure of expulsion started. 
                                                          
(2) See B. NASCIMBENE, Protocollo 4 – Artt. 3 e 4, in S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI, L. RAIMONDI, Commentario 
alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, Padova, 2001, p. 891 ss.  
(3) Under Article 2, “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by 
law”. 
(4) The principle of non-refoulement is one of the most important guarantees of the immigrants in case of decisions of 
return adopted by Member States. See B. NASCIMBENE, Lo straniero nel diritto internazionale, Milano, 2013; G. 
D’IGNAZIO, S. GAMBINO, Immigrazione e diritti fondamentali. Fra costituzioni nazionali, Unione europea e diritto 
internazionale, Milano, 2010; F. SCUTO, I diritti fondamentali della persona quale limite al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, 
Milano, 2012; A. HURWITZ, The collective responsibility of States to protect refugees, Oxford Monographs in International Law, 
Oxford, 2009. 
(5) ECtHR judgment 7.7.1989 in the Case of Soering v. United Kingdom. The applicant was a German national; he was 
charged with capital crime and was serving a sentence in the U.K. An order for the applicant's extradition to Virginia 
in the United States was issued. Therefore he faced a possible death sentence in Virginia and exposure to the death 
row. The ECHR found a violation of article 3, thereby recognizing the extra-territorial effect of the ECHR. The Court 
held that Article 3 could not be interpreted as prohibiting, in itself, capital punishment. However, the conditions of 
execution of the punishment (exposure to "death row" syndrome) would expose the applicant to a real risk of treatment 
going beyond the threshold set by Article 3. 
(6) Case Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden,  ECtHR judgment 20.3.1991. 
(7) See Case Chahal v. UK, ECtHR judgment 15.11.1996; Case Labari v. Turkey, ECtHR judgment 11.7.2000; Case Hilal v. 
UK, ECtHR judgment 6.3.2001. 
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Even though the Court, in this specific case, acknowledged that Sweden was not violating Article 3 of the 
Convention, it has nonetheless found that the prohibition of refoulement should be applied also in cases of 
irregular immigrants’ expulsion (8). The rationale underneath this decision was that Member States shall 
abide to the principle of non refoulement even towards irregular immigrants. Following the same line of 
reasoning, the Court has extended the protection provided by Article 3 also to cases of expulsions of 
immigrants involved in international terrorism from Italy (9). 
The Strasburg Court has then established that the ECHR prevents Member States from expelling an 
immigrant, even if “irregular”, when there is a serious risk that she or he could be subject to inhuman 
treatments in the country of destination. The Court also specified the conditions under which existence of 
the aforementioned risk should be assessed. On the one hand, the immigrant has the burden of proving the 
risk envisaged in case of expulsion. On the other hand, the State has a duty to verify the conditions in the 
country of destination in order to avoid violation of Article 3 in case of expulsion. The sentence J.K and others 
is a good example of the reasoning described above. An Iraqi family entered in business, in its home-country, 
with Americans clients. For this reason, from 2004 to 2008, it was the target of severe violence and 
persecutions by Al Qaeda. This included the assassination of one of the daughters, the kidnapping of a son, 
and several murder attempts on the father. In 2011, Sweden denied the family’s request of asylum. Swedish 
authorities argued that since the family didn’t work anymore with American clients, they wouldn’t be 
subjected to further retaliations if repatriated. However, the Grande Chambre was of a different advice. In the 
light of the fact that, in its opinion, there was a credible and serious risk of retaliation, it established that the 
Country of Sweden didn’t do enough to dispel any doubt about the aforementioned risk of future 
persecutions in case of expulsion (10). 
Drawing from this line of reasoning, in the F.G. case – which is one of the rare cases in which the protection 
was granted not only under Article 3 but also under the right to life recognized by Article 2 – the Grande 
                                                          
(8) § 70 of the judgment. 
(9) See the case Saadi v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 28.2.2008; Ben Salah v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 24.3.2009 and others 
judgments of 2009 against Italy under violation of Article 3. The Court underlined that state action relating to expulsion 
is restrained by the absolute nature of Article 3 and the positive obligation not to send individuals to a state where they 
are at real risk of prohibited treatment also in the case of terrorism. The absolute nature of the prohibition on torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment "enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic societies" 
and must therefore be maintained, even in times of emergency or war. Notwithstanding the fact that states face 
"immense difficulties" in combating the contemporary international terrorist threat, one's suspected involvement in 
terrorist activity does not take away from the absolute nature of their rights under Article 3. See S. SILEONI, La 
CEDU e l’espulsione di immigrati stranieri: il caso Saadi c. Italia, in Quaderni costituzionali, n. 3, 2009, p. 719 ss.. 
(10) Case J.K. and others v. Sweden , ECtHR judgment 23.08. 2016.  
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Chambre has ruled that if fundamental rights – such as the ones protected by the aforementioned articles – 
are at risk, while assessing the conditions of the country of destination the Member State has the duty to also 
take into account the factual elements that are not outlined in the applicant’s original request, but that emerge 
nonetheless from his deposition or documentation. In this specific case then, the ECtHR stated the Member 
State has a duty to verify whether an applicant’s conversion to Christianity implies a risk for his life, dignity 
or health in case of expulsion towards his home-country – in this case Iran (11). Even more so, this reasoning 
applies to the cases whereby said risk is easily verifiable through information that is public or otherwise easily 
accessible for the State’s organs.  
The notion of alien’s protection from conducts violating Article 3 has been extended to cover not only 
violations committed by the State’s public authorities, but also those perpetrated by political factions (12) 
and individuals (13). Yet, it has also been stated that the failure to enforce public order is not a sufficient 
condition to prove a serious risk of violations of protection from torture (14), and other limits have been set 
in order to benefit from this extension of protection (15). Nonetheless, the Court found that even if specific 
situations of humanitarian emergency existing in a given country do not imply an automatic violation of 
Article 3, they could justify its prima facie violation. In the Sufi and Elmi case, the Court held that the high level 
of violence and systematic violation of human rights in Mogadiscio, the capital of Somalia, constituted a 
serious and immediate risk of treatment contrary Article 3 for whoever happened to be in the city (16). Such 
conditions of danger shall be always effectively verified, since their evolution, even in a relatively short span 
of time, might be evidently the basis for a different decision. As a matter of fact, in the case K.A.B. the Court 
has ruled that the conditions of Mogadiscio, even if still troubling, considerably improved with respect to its 
previous decisions. Under these new premises, expulsions toward Mogadiscio were deemed to be compatible, 
                                                          
(11) Case F.G. v. Sweden, ECtHR judgment 23.03. 2016. 
(12) Case Ahmed v. Austria, ECtHR judgment 17.12.1996.  
(13) Case H.L.R. v. France, ECtHR judgment 29,04.1997. In that case the Court established the principle of protection 
for private individuals but didn’t find violations of Article 3. In a most recent case the Court stated that there would 
be violation of Article 3 of the Convention (see Case N. v. Finland, ECtHR judgment  26.7.2005). 
(14) On this point, see  Case Vilvaraja and others v. United Kingdom,  ECtHR judgment 30.10.1991. 
(15) On this point, see A. ESPOSITO, Article 3, in Commentario alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e 
delle libertà fondamentali, eds. S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI, L. RAIMONDI, 68-69. In the Case H.L.R. v. France the 
Court has ruled that the protection against action of private individuals must be guaranteed under two conditions that 
must be demonstrated: 1) the expulsion of an alien by a Contracting State may give rise to an issue under Article 3), 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real 
risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country; 2) Public local Authorities are 
incapable of protecting them from attacks by such persons. 
(16) See Case Sufi and Elmi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 28.11.2011 
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at least in theory, with the Convention, provided that the danger is thoroughly examined by the Member 
State on a case by case basis (17). 
 
2. The extension of the guarantees beyond the prohibition of refoulement 
Interestingly, by intervening in cases of expulsion this jurisprudence has progressively extended the 
guarantees for immigrants also beyond the prohibition of refoulement. 
As a matter of fact, the ECtHR, which remains entrenched to the field of aliens’ expulsion, has strengthen 
the principle of non-refoulement by establishing a series of procedural guarantees in order to protect the 
immigrant from a possible denial of the right to an effective remedy provided by Article 13 of the 
Convention. In a 2002 pronouncement, the Court stated that an immigrant’s appeal against an expulsion 
decision cannot be regarded as “effective” if the judge didn’t reach a decision before the expulsion took place 
(18). In the same judgment, the Court also intervened on the matter of the amount of time at disposal for 
irregular immigrants to present an asylum application before the expulsion decision is issued, and found that 
an extremely short deadline (five days in the specific case) amounts to a violation of Article 13. The 
importance of these provisions is not to be overlooked. As a matter of fact, they tackle come vital issues of 
the European discipline on expulsions, like the deadline for issuing an appeal and the temporary suspension 
of expulsion decisions. 
A further procedural safeguard for immigrants has been provided by another judgment of the Court in 2005 
(19). Citing Article 6 of the Convention, which recognizes the right to a fair trial (20), the ECtHR condemned 
Italy for failing to provide a translation of the proceedings at matter to a Tunisian citizen. This omission 
prevented him from participating in a trial in which he was involved, notwithstanding his expressed will to 
intervene. 
On this point, it has also to be noted that the ECHR noticeably limits the irregular immigrant’s right to a fair 
trial when a decision of expulsion is issued. As a matter of fact, protocol number 7 of the Convention outlines 
                                                          
(17) Case K.A.B. v. Sweden,  ECtHR judgment 05.09.2013. 
(18) Case Conka v. Belgium, ECtHR judgment 05.05.2002. The Court considered that  «the notion of an effective remedy 
under Article 13 requires that the remedy may prevent the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention 
and whose effects are potentially irreversible (see, mutatis mutandis, Jabari, cited above, § 50). Consequently, it is 
inconsistent with Article 13 for such measures to be executed before the national authorities have examined whether 
they are compatible with the Convention, although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner 
in which they conform to their obligations under this provision» (§ 79). 
(19) See Case Hermi v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 28.06.2005. 
(20) Article 6 of ECHR  provided for the right to a fair trial.. 
  
7                                            federalismi.it – ISSN 1826 3534   |Focus Human Rights n. 1/2018 
 
 
 
  
a number of procedural safeguards in cases of expulsion only for legally resident immigrants (21). Therefore, 
the ECtHR jurisprudence normally excludes procedural safeguards for irregular immigrants. As testified by 
some 2009 decisions (22), despite the fact that Article 6 of the Convention applies to every person, the Court 
found that the provisions of said article cannot be applied to the irregular immigrant in cases of expulsion. 
With regard to the cases of expulsion of third-country nationals, the ECtHR has also intervened in order to 
guarantee the right to health of aliens being expelled. The Court ruled that Member States shall always verify 
the health conditions of aliens to be returned because returns in cases of diseases that cannot be properly 
recovered in the country of destination amount to violation of the ban of torture sanctioned in Article 3. 
Nonetheless, in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the prohibition of expulsion due to healthcare concerns is 
limited to exceptional cases, namely to particularly serious diseases that demand humanitarian considerations. 
Under this perspective, in two cases the Court prevented Member States to return aliens affected from HIV 
(23). The reasoning of the Court was that the protection of fundamental rights shall prevail on other interests 
by virtue of which the provision of expulsion is issued, in the event of an immediate risk of death and in 
other very exceptional cases. In a recent decision, the Court has clarified that these “other very exceptional 
cases” should be understood as referring to situations involving the removal of a seriously ill person in which 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he or she, although not at imminent risk of dying, 
would face a real risk, on account of the absence of appropriate treatment in the receiving country or the 
impossibility to access to such treatment, of being exposed to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in his 
or her state of health, resulting in severe suffering or a significant reduction in life expectancy (24). In such 
cases, it is the applicants’ responsibility to disclose evidence capable of demonstrating that there are 
                                                          
       (21) See Article 1 of the Protocol n. 7, “Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens”: an alien lawfully 
resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with law and shall be allowed: (a) to submit reasons against his expulsion, (b) to have his case reviewed, 
and (c) to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons designated by that 
authority. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1.(a), (b) and (c) of this Article, 
when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of national security. 
(22) See Case Ben Salah v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 24.03.2009; case Sellem v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 5.5.2009; case Maaouia v. 
France, ECtHR judgment 5.10.2000. 
(23) See Case D. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 2.5.1997, § 51-53; Case B.B. v. France, ECtHR judgment 28.06.2005 
in which an alien from Congo applied for Asylum in France. In that specific case, the Court didn’t find any violation 
of article 3: «it appears, however, that as regards Article 3 of the Convention the measure reflects, through its continuity 
and duration, the French authorities’ intention to allow Mr. B.B. to receive the treatment his present condition requires 
and to guarantee him, for the time being, the right to remain in France. In that connection, it should be noted that in 
their memorial of 16 July 1998 the Government indicated that they “[had] not shown any intention of actually 
deporting Mr. B.B.» (par. 37).See also Case N. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 27.5.2008. 
(24) See case Paposhvili v. Belgium, ECtHR judgment 13.12.2016.  
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substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure of expulsion were to be implemented, they would be 
exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Where such evidence exists, it is 
the expelling States’ responsibility, in the context of domestic procedures, to dispel any doubts raised by it. 
The risk that is alleged must be subjected to close scrutiny and shall take into account not only the availability 
of medical treatments in the destination country, but also whether the alien would actually have access to 
this specific treatments and facilities in the State of destination. 
With regard to Article 5 of the ECHR, which allows restrictions to the aliens’ right to liberty when it comes 
to prevent them from illegally entering a Member State, or in cases in which they are subjected to procedures 
of expulsion or extradition (25), the Court has also ruled on measures that limit immigrants’ personal liberty 
(26). In this regard, it is worth recalling the sentence Amuur (27). The case was about Somali citizens that, 
without a residency permit, had been stopped in the international transit area of Paris-Orly airport and 
detained there for twenty days. As stated by the Court, the detention of aliens’ should not be prolonged 
excessively, otherwise there would be a risk of it turning a mere restriction on liberty – inevitable when it 
comes to organizing the practical details of the alien's repatriation or, if he has requested asylum, while his 
application to enter the territory for that purpose is considered – into an effective deprivation of liberty. It 
must be also stressed that the measure is not only applicable to those who have committed criminal offences 
but also to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own country (28). Remembering that 
the extension of the detention period needs to be approve by a decision of the judiciary, the Court has 
sanctioned that in that case French provisions didn’t sufficiently guarantee the right to liberty recognized by 
the ECHR (29). With a 2004 decision upon an alien’s treatment inside an Italian “Temporary Detention 
Center”, the ECtHR, after citing its own jurisprudence on matters of detection (see the Amuur case), stated 
that Article 5 applies also to cases of aliens’ detention in such “Centers” (30). 
On this point the ECtHR has opted for the protection of some basic guarantees for the irregular immigrant, 
subject to a return decision, whose liberty is limited. It has then been stated that the detention should have 
a reasonable duration and should not turn into a restriction of personal liberty, with the exception of the 
                                                          
(25) Article 5, c. 1, lett. f) of the Convention. 
(26) On the jurisprudence of the Court on Article 5, lett. f) della Convenzione, see M. PISANI, Article5, in Commentario 
alla Convenzione europea per la tutela dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, eds. S. BARTOLE, B. CONFORTI, L. 
RAIMONDI, 127 ss. 
(27) Case Amuur v. France, ECtHR judgment 25.6.1996 
(28) In relation of National legal orders that don’t provide the crime of illegal entry of aliens.  
(29) Article 5.1 ECHR.   
(30)  Case Zaciri v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 13.5.2004. 
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cases specifically outlined by Article 5. Hence, the modality enacted by state authorities to limit aliens’ 
personal liberty itself – which could be legitimate in light of Article 5 – might nonetheless amount to a 
violation of this Article (31). With the 2008 Saadi pronouncement (32), the ECtHR has specified the criteria 
according to which a restriction of an irregular immigrant’s personal liberty is not to be considered a violation 
of the Convention. Among these, it is worth mentioning the principle of proportionality – i.e. the need to 
strike a balance between the importance of securing the immediate fulfillment of the obligation in question 
in a democratic society, and the importance of the right to liberty – with regard to the duration of the 
detention and the need that the conditions of detention should be appropriate thus allowing a decent stay 
(33). 
Moving from Article 5, ECtHR’s jurisprudence has then introduced some criteria directed at limiting the 
discretion of national authorities in favor of the alien’s basic rights and liberties, even when he or her is 
subjected to an expulsion decision. In this sense, Article 5 has allowed the Court, with a 2011 decision, to 
declare the illegality of a custody in an Italian detention center. A Bosnian citizen irregularly present in Italy 
gave birth to a baby, which died shortly after, and was then taken to a detention center waiting for the 
enactment of the expulsion decision. Since Italian law prohibits expulsion for the six months following the 
childbirth (34), the Court has found the expulsion decision illegal and the Bosnian citizen was released. 
 
3. The prohibition of collective expulsions of aliens  
With its decisions The Strasbourg Court has also intervened on the aliens’ right to not undergo collective 
expulsions. Differently from the cases examined thus far, in this case the protection of aliens’ rights laid 
down by the Court is not indirect but rather directly provided by Article 4 of the Protocol 4 of the 
Convention, that provides the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens (35). This Article openly rules the 
aforementioned prohibition in reason of Member States’ duty to take decisions about aliens’ expulsions on 
                                                          
(31) See, on this point, the recalled Case Conka v. Belgium, ECtHR judgment 05.05.2002.  
(32) Case Saadi v. United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 29.01.2008. 
(33) In Saadi, The Court fixed some criteria about detention: “to avoid being branded as arbitrary, such detention must 
be carried out in good faith; it must be closely connected to the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry of the person 
to the country; the place and conditions of detention should be appropriate, bearing in mind that “the measure is 
applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have 
fled from their own country” (see Amuur, cited above, § 43); and the length of the detention should not exceed that 
reasonably required for the purpose pursued” (Saadi, §§ 70-90). See also A. and others v. United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 
19.2.2009. 
(34) Article 19, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998 - Italian Immigration Act. 
(35) The Protocol has been signed in Strasburg on September 16th 1963. 
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a case-by-case basis. Since its first decision (36) on an expulsion decided by the Danish Government for 199 
South Vietnamese children, the ECtHR has excluded the occurrence of collective expulsion if such measure 
is taken after, and on the basis of, a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each 
individual belonging to the group. In the case in point, the Court has eventually declared the claim of a 
violation of Protocol 4 inadmissible, and this interpretation was later confirmed by further decisions (37). To 
be true, applications on the basis of alleged violations of the prohibition of collective expulsions were rejected 
in many occasions. An exception to this trend can nonetheless be found in the aforementioned 2002 
ECtHR’s decision (Conka v. Belgium). In that occasion the Court ascertained the occurrence of a collective 
expulsion due to the fact that little attention had been paid to the individual cases while formulating the 
expulsion decision of the group (38). A second exception occurred in the 2014 Georgia case, which involved 
a decision of expulsion directed towards several thousands Georgian citizens residing (both lawfully and 
irregularly) in Russia. Even though each case proved to have been separately considered by the judiciary, the 
Court nonetheless found that these expulsion decisions amounted to a violation of Protocol 4 since the high 
number of decisions, combined with the little span of time whereby these were taken, actually prevented the 
competent authority from conducting a reasonable and objective examination of each individual case. (39). 
In the same year, the Court found a further violation of Article 4 of Protocol 4 by Italy – along with a 
violation of Article 3 and Article 13 of the Convention by both Italy and Greece. In the case Sharifi and others, 
four immigrants had been intercepted by the Italian border police while disembarking from a ship coming 
from Greece and were immediately returned there. It must be also noted that this practice of “summary” 
returns was in clear violation of the 1999 bilateral agreements between Italy and Greece but nonetheless 
seemed to have turned into a common practice in time. For the Court, the lack of a communication of their 
rights to the aliens, especially the right to apply for asylum – in a way that allows an effective access to said 
rights (e.g. by recurring to a translator), combined with the violation of the bilateral agreements, amounted 
to a violation of both the right to a fair trial and the rights protected by Article 3 of the Convention. As far 
as Italy was concerned, it was acknowledged the violation of article 4 of Protocol 4 inasmuch as the border 
authorities enacted an indiscriminate expulsion of the four applicants (40). 
                                                          
(36) Case Becker v. Denmark,  ECtHR judgment 3.10.1975.  
(37) See case Alikabas and others v. Netherland,  ECtHR judgment 16.12.1988; case A. v. Netherland ECtHR judgment 
6.5.1986; case Andric v. Sweden, ECtHR judgment 23.2.1999; case Sultani v. France ECtHR judgment 20.9.2007.  
(38) See again Conka, ECtHR judgment 5.5.2002,. 
(39) Case Georgia v. Russia, ECtHR judgment 3.07.2014. 
(40) Case Sharifi and others v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 21.10.2014. 
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As far as the prohibition of collective expulsion is concerned, the most important case recently adjudicated 
by the Court is, undoubtedly, that of Khlaifia and others. The framework of the incident was that of the “refugee 
crisis”, which is the massive increase in the migratory flows toward Europe – and particularly Italy - as 
consequence of the so-called Arab Spring. In this case, three Tunisian citizens illegally arrived in Lampedusa 
and were thereafter detained in two ships at the port of Palermo, and were later expelled according to the 
simplified procedure provided by a 2011 bilateral agreement between Italy and Tunisia. In this occasion, the 
Grand Chambre intervened by clarifying the effective scope of Article 4 of Protocol 4. According to its 
decision, Article 4 of Protocol 4 does not provide to each alien the right to an individual interview. Rather, 
the content of the aforementioned rule is said to be respected when each alien has effectively had a real 
possibility to provide arguments against its expulsion, and these arguments are effectively considered by State 
authorities (41). In the case in point, the applicants had twice been subjected to the identification procedure, 
their nationality was ascertained and they had been provided the possibility to present their arguments in 
order to clarify their individual situation. In the same line, the Court has clarified that Article 13 of the 
Convention, taken together with Article 4 of Protocol 4, does not impose an absolute obligation on a State 
to guarantee an automatically suspensive remedy to the expulsion decision. For the Court, when an alien 
alleges that the expulsion procedure was “collective” in nature, without claiming at the same time that it had 
exposed him or her to a risk of irreversible harm in the form of a violation of Articles 2 or 3 of the 
Convention, his or her rights are guaranteed if him or her is provided an effective possibility of challenging 
the expulsion decision by having a sufficiently thorough examination of his or her complaints carried out by 
an independent and impartial domestic forum. This decision could betray the Court’s concerns for the 
situation of emergency represented by an unprecedented boost in immigration flows that some European 
Countries were facing at the time of its decision. In fact, the ECtHR has justified a narrower interpretation 
of aliens’ rights (particularly against expulsion decisions) to accommodate the States’ needs to control the 
migration flows by means of an elastic (and in some ways political) use of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation which has allowed to take into account the reasons of efficiency that the aforementioned 
situation required to be adequately addressed. 
 
 
 
                                                          
(41) Khlaifia and others v. Italy, ECtHR judgment 15.12.2016. 
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4. The importance of the 2012 Hirsi Jamaa judgment  
As far the jurisprudence of the Court on the subject of aliens’ expulsion is concerned, this 2012 decision is 
of particular relevance. Here, the Court has stressed the importance of compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement in the context of operations carried out on the high sea by signatory States. In the case in point, 
the Court has condemned Italy for intercepting irregular immigrants on high sea and transferring them to 
Libya, since this practice violates Articles 3, 13 of the Convention and 4 of Protocol 4. This pronouncement 
can be regarded as the fil rouge of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the protection of irregular immigrants’ rights 
inasmuch as it refers to the prohibition of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment - out of which, as 
previously stated, stems the principle of non refoulement - to the right to an effective remedy and to the 
prohibition of collective expulsions of aliens. At the same time, this unprecedented judgment paved the way 
for future interventions by the ECtHR aimed at a broader protection of irregular aliens’ rights and guarantees. 
For these reasons, the UNHCR has qualified this pronouncement as “historic”.  
As already mentioned, with the Hirsi Jamaa judgment of the 23th February 2012 (42), the Court has condemned 
Italy for the group expulsion towards Libya of Somali and Eritrean citizens occurred in May 2009 (43).   
Firstly, in this case the Court has recognized a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits inhuman 
or degrading treatments. In line with its jurisprudence that connects the principle of non refoulement to Article 
3, while adjudicating on this point the Court had to ascertain the conditions of the aliens’ country of 
provenience as well as those of the country of destination of the transfers operated by Italy - namely Somalia, 
Eritrea and Libya. By so doing, the ECtHR has established that the transfers towards Libya were illegitimate, 
and amounted to a twofold violation of Article 3. First, the Libyan authorities failed to provide Italy with 
sufficient guarantees in relation to the effective protection of refugees. Second, the transfer of the applicants 
to Libya exposed them to the risk of arbitrary repatriation – i.e. towards their home countries, in which the 
general situation similarly posed serious and widespread problems of insecurity – by Libyan State authorities. 
On the one hand, neither Somalia nor Eritrea had ratified the Geneva Convention on Refugees Status and 
individuals forcibly repatriated to Eritrea faced the serious risk of being tortured and detained in inhuman 
conditions merely for having left the country irregularly. On the other hand, a 2010 report drafted by the 
                                                          
(42) Case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy. 
(43)The Applicants were 11 Somali and Eritrean migrants, part of a group of about two hundred individuals, who left 
Libya in 2009 aboard three vessels with the aim of reaching the Italian coast. On 6 May 2009, when the vessels were 
within the Maltese Search and Rescue Region of responsibility, they were intercepted by ships from the Italian Revenue 
Police and the Coastguard. The occupants of the intercepted vessels were transferred onto Italian military ships and 
returned to Tripoli.  
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Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, revealed a 
systematic violation of irregular aliens’ guarantees and rights in Libya (44) – among which the forced returns 
of irregular migrants, including asylum-seekers and refugees, to high-risk countries. 
In addition, for the very first time in its jurisprudence, the Court has also adjudicated on the prohibition of 
collective expulsions of aliens carried out outside of the national territory of the signatory State involved (45). 
The rationale provided by the Court for this intervention is that the removal of aliens carried out in the 
context of interceptions on the high seas by the authorities of a State in the exercise of their sovereign 
authority, the effect of which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to push 
them back to another State, constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the 
Convention, which engages the responsibility of the State in question under Article 4 of Protocol 4. 
Therefore, the transfer of the applicants to Libya – carried out without any form of examination of each 
applicant’s individual situation and in the absence of interpreters or legal advisers on board – was deemed to 
instantiate a case of collective expulsion and, hence, a violation of Article 4 of Protocol 4. This 
acknowledgment is also particularly relevant due to the fact that up to that moment the Court had recognized 
such violation in only one occasion (46). 
To conclude, the Court has also adjudicated on the alleged violations of Article 13 of the ECHR concerning 
the right to an effective remedy. For the Court, these practices of aliens’ expulsion violated Article 13 of the 
Convention, if said article is read in conjunction with Article 4 of Protocol 4 and with the principle of non 
refoulement. As a matter of fact, the applicants were deprived of any remedy which would have enabled them 
to lodge their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 with a competent 
authority and to obtain a thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal measure 
was enforced, nor had the opportunity (both factual and legal) of applying before the Italian criminal courts 
upon their arrival in Libya. 
The reasons why this sentence has rightly been considered “historical” are manifold. First, the judge has 
downplayed the principle of territoriality in favor of aliens’ fundamental rights. As already seen, the Court 
has introduced in its jurisprudence the principle according to which the Contracting States shall abide by the 
prohibition of refoulement and collective expulsions in the exercise of their jurisdiction regardless of where this 
exercise takes place. In substance, the Court has introduced extraterritorial guarantees that do not allow for 
                                                          
(44) Report of 28th april 2010.  
(45) Article 4 of Protocol n. 4 of  the ECHR. 
(46) See again Conka v. Belgium. 
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“protection-less zones”. Not even in high sea. Furthermore, the Court has provided for a broad 
interpretation of the ECHR in that the definition of “collective expulsions” is also extended to operations 
resulting in the transfer of aliens. As emerges from the Court’s assessment, this choice was not obvious. 
Indeed, a narrower interpretation of the norms there considered would have limited the prohibition of 
collective expulsions only to cases of expulsion or transfer carried out by a Member State towards aliens 
irregularly present of the territory of the aforementioned Member State, thus rendering it inapplicable to 
cases of interception of migrants on the high seas and their removal to countries of transit or origin. 
The ECtHR’s intervention has therefore considerably increased the safeguards for irregular immigrants 
subjected to refoulement decisions by entrusting them further guarantees that Signatory States shall now take 
into account when enacting refoulement measures of aliens. Thanks to this judgment then, the high sea 
interception and removal of aliens is no more a viable option to control irregular migration. Hence, new and 
other means need to be worked out. In so doing, a balance is to be struck between the Signatory States’s 
need to cope with the continued intensification of the migratory flows and the safeguard of aliens. This new 
course, which has no shortcuts, shall not but pass through a greater cooperation at the European level based 
on a fairer sharing of responsibilities among the Member States.  
 
5. The ECtHR’s pronouncement upon the “Dublin System” on expulsions of asylum seekers  
It is known that the EU law, in the form of the Dublin regulation, which establishes the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, has created 
a net imbalance among EU States in that a vast majority of asylum applications occurring within EU 
boundaries is eventually examined by only a few Member States. This asymmetry has then generated 
considerable pressure upon the asylum systems of EU countries looking out onto the Mediterranean Sea, 
namely Italy and Greece. As consequence, some national asylum systems, such as the Greek one, collapsed, 
and this led to an overall deterioration in the protection of basic rights in the European space. Despite the 
clear inadequacy of Dublin System’s mechanisms to develop a common European asylum system and a 
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibilities between Member States - as provided by the Lisbon treaty itself (see Articles 67 and 80 of 
the TFEU) - national egoisms effectively prevailed for years. In the aphasia of the European legislator, the 
  
15                                            federalismi.it – ISSN 1826 3534   |Focus Human Rights n. 1/2018 
 
 
 
  
first attempts at redefining this corpus of norms came from the ECtHR and from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU).  
Indeed, an extensive jurisprudence, particularly of the ECtHR, has put under question the Dublin System 
through judgments that found that some transfer decisions of asylum seekers taken on the basis of the Dublin 
regulation’s norm as illegitimate were illegal: providing that an applicant has irregularly crossed the border 
into a Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered 
shall be responsible for examining the application for international protection (47) (Article 13). In point of 
fact, two 2011 judgments are worth recalling. In both cases, the ECtHR and the CJEU found transfer 
decisions of asylum seekers from the United Kingdom (UK) and Belgium towards Greece to be illegitimate: 
the transfers were based on the argument that Greece was the European country where the asylum seekers 
entered first (48). Drawing from the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, both the ECtHr 
and CJEU have established that Member States shall not transfer asylum seekers towards other Member 
States – even if the transfer is formally in compliance with Dublin II – as they cannot ignore the systemic 
shortcomings in the asylum procedures as a consequence of unparalleled migratory flows that, by provoking 
a drop in the standards of asylum seekers’ protection, may expose them to inhuman or degrading treatment, 
as the situation in Greece instantiates. 
As mentioned above, building on an already consolidated jurisprudence (49), the ECtHR has repeatedly 
condemned aliens’ transfers between Member States. With regard to Italy, this has also entailed the 
                                                          
     47 See article 13 of the REGULATION (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. 
48 Court of Justice of the European Union, 21.12.2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10. ECtHR judgment 21.01.2011, case 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece The facts of the case M.S.S. concerned an Afghan asylum seeker 
who fled Kabul in 2008, entered the European Union through Greece and travelled on to Belgium where he applied 
for asylum. According to the Dublin rules, Greece was held to be the responsible Member State for the examination 
of his asylum application. Therefore the Belgian authorities transferred him there in June 2009 where he faced 
detention in insalubrious conditions before living on the streets without any material support. The Court found a 
violation of Article 3 by Belgium for exposing the asylum seeker to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the asylum 
procedure in Greece. 
49 There is a large number of “Dublin Cases” in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR starting from 2000. See case T.I. v. 
the United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 07.03.2000; case K.R.S. v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment 02.12.2008; case M.S.S. 
v. Belgium and Greece, ECtHR judgment 21.01.2011; case Mohammed Hussein v. the Netherlands and Italy, ECtHR judgment 
02.04.2013; case Halimi v. Austria and Italy, ECtHR judgment 18.06.2013; case Abubeker v. Austria and Italy, ECtHR 
judgment 18.06.2013; case Mohammed v. Austria, ECtHR judgment 06.06.2013; case Sharifi v. Austria, ECtHR judgment 
5.12.2013; case Mohammadi v. Austria, ECtHR judgment 03.07.2014; case Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, ECtHR 
judgment 21.10.2014; case Tarakhel v. Switzerland, ECtHR judgment 4.11.2014;  case A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, ECtHR 
judgment 13.01.2015; case A.S. v. Switzerland, ECtHR judgment 30.06.2015.   
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prohibition of immigrants’ transfer from the Adriatic ports to Greece based on a 2004 bilateral readmission 
agreement between the two countries. With the Sharifi judgment of 2014 (50), the Court has condemned 
Italy due to the fact that the aforementioned transfers, which were automatically enacted, hence preventing 
aliens the access to asylum procedure at the port of Ancona, subjected potential asylum seekers to an effective 
risk in view of the apparent and serious inefficiencies of the Greek asylum system. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Even though the ECHR contains some provisions which narrow the guarantees of irregular immigrants 
subjected to an expulsion decision (51), the ECtHR’s evolving jurisprudence has nevertheless provided for 
an essential level of protection in those cases. The activity of the Court of Strasbourg deserves to be 
particularly appreciated inasmuch as the Convention does not provide a significant and explicit protection 
system for aliens. This jurisprudence becomes particularly relevant with reference to the broad scope that it 
attributes to Article 3 on the prohibition of torture, which translates into an increase in the guarantees for 
immigrants subjected to a decision of expulsion. From the scrutiny of ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the Court’s 
commitment to ensuring a minimum level of protection also to irregular immigrants subjected to expulsion 
decision clearly emerges. Beyond the merits examined thus far, some aspects are worth noticing in conclusion 
of this essay. 
First, over these years this jurisprudence has enlighten Member States’ shortcomings in their, albeit legitimate, 
action of border control and contrast of irregular immigration. In this sense, the Court has established an 
essential level of aliens’ protection, also in cases of expulsion, by basing it on the rights provided by the 
ECHR. 
Second, in times characterized by policies fighting irregular immigration both at the national and at the EU 
level, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence –in some cases jointly with that of national Constitutional Courts (52) – 
has had a prominent role in re-striking a balance between Member States and EU’s need to control migratory 
flows and contrast illegal immigration and the need to guarantee the respect of fundamental human rights. 
                                                          
50 Case Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, ECtHR judgment 21.10.2014. The Court found a violation of article 3 and 
article 4 of Protocol n. 4  of the ECHR. 
     (51) See the above mentioned article 5.1, lett. f) and article 1, Protocol n. 7 of the ECHR. The first permits limitasions 
of right to liberty and detension of an alien to prevent his effecting an unauthorised entry into the country. The second 
article provides some procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens lawfully resident.   
52 For the case of Italy, see F. SCUTO, I diritti fondamentali della persona quale limite al contrasto dell’immigrazione irregolare, 
Milano, 2012. 
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As far as this aspect is concerned, the ECtHR’s intervention against policies of collective expulsions and high 
sea refoulement – which represented extremely problematic tools of intervention against irregular immigration 
in terms of protection of fundamental rights – has been particularly prominent. 
Third, the more recent jurisprudence of the Court might provide a basis for a rational approach to the 
refugees crisis of our time. On the one hand, the acknowledgement of the problems that Member States are 
facing in the management of migratory flows (see the Sharifi case). On the other hand, the effort – together 
with the CJEU – at enacting the principles of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities among the Member 
States provided by Article 67 and 80 of the TFEU. These two might become the “pillars” of a new migration 
policy that is more rational vis-à-vis the current situation, as well as in full compliance with aliens’ rights. 
